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FIXED PRICE PLUS RATIONING: AN EXPERIMENT 
 







  This paper theoretically and experimentally explores a fixed price mechanism in 
which, if aggregate demand exceeds supply, bidders are proportionally rationed.  If 
demand is uncertain, in equilibrium bidders overstate their true demand in order to 
alleviate the effects of being rationed.  This effect is the more intense the lower the 
price, and bids reach their upper limit for sufficiently low prices.  In the experiment we 
observe a significant proportion of equilibrium play.  However, subjects tend to overbid 
the equilibrium strategy when prices are low and underbid when prices are high.  We 
explain the experimental evidence by a simple model in which the probability of a 
deviation is decreasing in the expected loss associated with it 
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Fig. 3Coef. Std. Err. z     P>z [95% Conf. Interval]
T2 0,162 0,016 10,340 0,000 0,132 0,193
T3 0,181 0,016 11,530 0,000 0,150 0,212
T4 0,194 0,016 12,360 0,000 0,163 0,225
p*T1 -0,779 0,019 -41,010 0,000 -0,816 -0,742
p*T2 -0,995 0,019 -52,410 0,000 -1,033 -0,958
p*T3 -1,017 0,019 -53,560 0,000 -1,054 -0,980
p*T4 -1,033 0,019 -54,400 0,000 -1,070 -0,996
const. 0,853 0,020 42,480 0,000 0,813 0,892
Tab. 1Coef. Std. Err. z     P>z [95% Conf. Interval]
T2*pHIGH -0,120 0,212 -0,560 0,572 -0,535 0,296
T3*pHIGH 0,009 0,091 0,100 0,923 -0,170 0,187
T4*pHIGH 0,054 0,080 0,670 0,500 -0,103 0,211
T1*pINT -0,003 0,177 -0,020 0,986 -0,350 0,344
T2*pINT 0,305 0,213 1,430 0,153 -0,113 0,723
T3*pINT 0,114 0,192 0,590 0,552 -0,262 0,491
T4*pINT 0,543 0,230 2,360 0,018 0,093 0,993
T1*pLOW -0,120 0,065 -1,860 0,063 -0,247 0,007
T2*pLOW -0,052 0,073 -0,710 0,477 -0,196 0,092
T3*pLOW -0,057 0,067 -0,850 0,396 -0,188 0,074
T4*pLOW -0,024 0,080 -0,310 0,760 -0,180 0,132
p*T1*pHIGH -1,016 0,099 -10,250 0,000 -1,210 -0,822
p*T2*pHIGH -0,908 0,204 -4,460 0,000 -1,307 -0,509
p*T3*pHIGH -1,070 0,025 -42,750 0,000 -1,119 -1,021
p*T4*pHIGH -1,117 0,049 -23,030 0,000 -1,212 -1,022
p*T1*pINT -0,954 0,262 -3,640 0,000 -1,468 -0,441
p*T2*pINT -1,429 0,226 -6,310 0,000 -1,873 -0,986
p*T3*pINT -1,110 0,269 -4,130 0,000 -1,636 -0,583
p*T4*pINT -1,715 0,288 -5,940 0,000 -2,280 -1,149
p*T1*pLOW -0,634 0,048 -13,180 0,000 -0,728 -0,539
p*T2*pLOW -0,636 0,035 -18,230 0,000 -0,704 -0,567
p*T3*pLOW -0,540 0,091 -5,940 0,000 -0,717 -0,362
p*T4*pLOW -0,541 0,094 -5,750 0,000 -0,725 -0,356
_cons 1,060 0,085 12,540 0,000 0,894 1,225
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Fig. 5